Does human law command the acts of all the virtues?

It seems that human law does not command the acts of all the virtues:

Objection 1:  The acts of the vices are opposed to the acts of the virtues.  But as has been explained (a. 2), human law does not prohibit all the vices.  Therefore, human law does not command the acts of all the virtues.

Objection 2:  The act of a virtue proceeds from that virtue.  But virtue is the end of law, and so what proceeds from a virtue cannot fall under a precept of the law.  Therefore, human law does not command the acts of all the virtues.

Objection 3:  As has been explained (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good.  But certain acts of the virtues are ordered not toward the common good, but instead toward [the agent’s] private good.  Therefore, the law does not command the acts of all the virtues.

But contrary to this:  In Ethics 5 the Philosopher says, “The law commands the acts of the brave man and the acts of the temperate man and the acts of the mild‑mannered man—and so on for the other virtues and vices, commanding the former and prohibiting the latter.”

I respond:  As is clear from what was said above (q. 54, a. 2), the species of virtue are distinguished by their objects.  But all the objects of the virtues can be traced back either to the private good of an individual or to the common good of a multitude.  For instance, one can execute acts of fortitude either for the sake of conserving the community or for the sake of preserving a friend’s rights.
Now as has been explained (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good.  And so there is no virtue such that the law cannot command acts of that virtue.  However, human law does not issue commands concerning all the acts of all the virtues; instead, it commands only those acts which can be ordered toward the common good either (a) immediately, as when certain acts are done directly because of the common good, or (b) mediately, as when the lawmaker commands certain acts pertaining to the good discipline through which citizens are formed in such a way as to conserve the good of justice and peace.

Reply to objection 1:  Human law does not prohibit all vicious acts by an obligatory precept, just as it does not command all virtuous acts, either.  Yet it prohibits certain acts of individual vices, just as it likewise commands certain acts of individual virtues.

Reply to objection 2:  There are two ways in which an act is said to be an act of a virtue:
First, because the man is doing something virtuous.  For instance, it is an act of justice to do something right and an act of fortitude to do something brave.  In this sense the law commands some acts of the virtues.
Second, because the man is doing something virtuous in the way that a virtuous man does it.  An act of this sort always proceeds from the virtue and never falls under a precept of the law, but is instead the end which the lawmaker intends to lead [the citizens] to.

Reply to objection 3:  As has been explained, there is no virtue whose acts cannot be ordered toward the common good, either mediately or immediately.